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I. INTRODUCTION
With roots in France, the minuet dance dominated the ballrooms
of Louis XIV and spread throughout Europe and beyond. A social
baroque dance, the minuet sees the two partners dancing separately in
plain steps forward, backward, and sideways, while gradually and
gracefully coming close to one another. Eventually, the pair come to
hold hands, briefly continuing their dance together until separated again
by their own movement. Throughout the entire dance, the two partners
repeatedly come close, only to separate from one another. A similar
movement can be observed between the U.S. and the EU in the
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interaction of copyright laws and human rights 1—the two jurisdictions
continuously come close to one another, walking similar paths, then
separate, spinning off in their own direction, only to then reunite for a
few more steps in harmony.
Similar to the graceful forward, backward and sideways movements
in a minuet, 2 the dynamics between intellectual property (IP) and
human rights have intensified to the extent that human rights law is now
characterized as IP’s new frontier. 3 More specifically, when balancing
various interests at stake in both the United States and the European
Union, copyright laws engage internal as well as external mechanisms.
Interestingly, the application of these tools takes place not only within
the legislative powers of the two jurisdictions but, most prominently,
within the judiciary. In this respect, the jurisprudence of the United
States and the European Union have often harmoniously intertwined in
an elegant move towards one another, before gradually swirling away
into disparate interpretations.
That said, the European Union and the United States bear a
relative degree of similarity as far as their general frameworks are
concerned. In the European Union, the external safeguards are defined
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the
Charter), 4 while the First Amendment 5 to the U.S. Constitution serves
that role across the Atlantic. A parallel can also be drawn from the
internal safeguards of each jurisdiction. Main tools in this realm are the
idea-expression dichotomy—applicable equally in both jurisdictions—
and certain permitted uses, 6 such as fair use in the U.S. Copyright Act
of 1976 7 and limitations and exceptions enshrined in Article 5 of
Directive 2001/29/EC in the EU 8
Such mirroring legislative structures imply that the United States
and the EU theoretically do not stand too far from one another when it
comes to the intersection of copyright and fundamental rights. Indeed,
In this work, “copyright/human rights” and “copyright/fundamental rights” interaction
will be used interchangeably when the discussion pertains to both the U.S. and EU
jurisdictions. When the purview is on the United States, the former term will be used;
when the EU is concerned, the latter will be employed.
Laurence R. Helfer, Mapping the Interface Between Human Rights and Intellectual
Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 6–15, 9 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 1 (2008).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
This work uses the term “permitted uses” to collectively refer to the exceptions and
limitations regime in the fair use doctrines of the EU and the United States.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive].
1

2

3

4
5
6

7
8
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when tracing the leading jurisprudence in both territories, one observes
that the two jurisdictions start from similar steppingstones. Despite this
common background, the copyright and fundamental rights intersection
somehow takes different interpretative routes and balancing exercises
that involve diverging methodologies. While for a certain period of time,
it seemed as though the EU had not entirely shut the door to external
balancing, 9 the United States appeared willing to foreclose external
balancing after the landmark ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Eldred v. Ashcroft in 2003. 10
Nonetheless, the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
of the EU (CJEU) suggests that internal balancing based on permitted
uses and the idea-expression dichotomy is well-suited to address
conflicts based on the copyright and fundamental rights intersection. 11
Eventually, the EU and the United States have apparently gradually
reunited in their affirmation that the copyright legislative framework is
self-sufficient to internalize the conflict.
The overall purpose of this article is to analyze the extent to which
the approach in the EU differs from that in the United States. To do so,
we first look at the essence of the internal and external safeguards (Part
II). We then turn our focus to the leading case law in the United States
and compare it to the CJEU’s practice. In this respect, we seek to verify
whether and to what extent the decision-making process in the two
jurisdictions has converged or diverged over the years (Part III). In the
final part, we conclude by suggesting that, at the moment, it seems that
the two systems are dancing side-by-side in the same direction.
II. THE ESSENCE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SAFEGUARDS
All coherent copyright legislations aim to establish an internal
equilibrium between the interests of the rightsholders and the public. In
this respect, copyright legislation regularly refers to the need to maintain
a fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of

See Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Ger. GmbH (Sept. 15, 2016),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=183363&doclang=en; Case
C-360/10,
SABAM
v.
Netlog
NV
(Feb.
16,
2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=119512&doclang=en; Case
C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959; Case C-275/06,
Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=216552&doclang=en; Case
C-516/17,
Spiegel
Online
GmbH
v.
Beck
(July
29,
2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=216543&doclang=en; Case
C‑469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (July 29,
2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=216545&doclang=
en.
9

10
11
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rightsholders, the public, and users of protected subject matter. 12 In
other words, copyright laws grant rightsholders exclusive rights while
providing internal mechanisms to sufficiently balance and protect the
interests of the public and users of copyright protected works.
Ostensibly, copyright could be considered an island of exclusivity in a
sea of freedom, in line with the idea that intellectual property rights
(IPRs) are “islands of protection in a sea of competition.” 13
One such internal mechanism is the idea-expression dichotomy,
according to which, ideas roam free and copyright protects only the
original expression of such ideas. 14 The dichotomy is a significant tool
in preserving the balance of copyright and fundamental rights within the
copyright law system. 15 The essence of the idea-expression dichotomy is
that rightsholders have only a limited capacity to control the expression
of their ideas and cannot restrain the use of the underlying ideas
themselves. 16 This supports the grander theme that ideas enrich the
public domain, which, in turn, is the milieu that nurtures creativity. 17
Nonetheless, the idea-expression dichotomy acquires a different
flavor in common law versus civil law jurisdictions. This is rooted in the
difference in theories that rationalize the existence of copyright in the
first place. 18 For instance, viewed from a utilitarian perspective,
restricting copyright protection to the sole expression of ideas has a twofold objective. On the one hand, the dichotomy ensures free access to
knowledge such as methods, systems, facts, utilitarian objects, titles,
InfoSoc Directive, supra note 8, at recital 31; Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC & 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L
130) 92, recital 6, art. 18(2).
See Jerome H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 517 (1995); Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1748
n.17 (2000); Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of
Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268, 268
(2004).
MICHEL VIVANT & JEAN-MICHEL BRUGUIÈRE, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROITS VOISINS
151 (4th ed. 2019).
Abraham Drassinower, Exceptions Properly So-Called, in LANGUAGE AND
COPYRIGHT 205, 230–31 (Ysolde Gendreau & Abraham Drassinower eds., 2009).
Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229,
1247 (2016); Neil Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment; What Eldred Misses—
and Portends, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSES 127 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005) (criticizing the
adequacy of internal safeguards with specific reference to the idea-expression dichotomy
and the fair use doctrine).
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 969 (1990).
Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, Sharing Content: Natural-Right Copyright and Digital
Environment, in 5 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 197 (Fiona Macmillan ed.,
2007).
12
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themes, plots, scène à faire, styles or—as Professor Litman describes it—
a “hodgepodge of unprotectable subject matter.” 19 This, in turn, enables
progress since raw material is always available to everyone to build upon.
On the other hand, the idea-expression dichotomy is a fundamental tool
in striking the balance between copyright and free speech and, more
generally, is a constitutive element of any utilitarian copyright rationale. 20
The dichotomy sometimes encroaches upon freedom of speech “in that
it abridges the right to reproduce the ‘expression’ of others” in favor of
the “greater public good in the copyright encouragement of creative
works.” 21 Other times, instead, it “encroaches upon the author’s right
to control his works in that it renders his ‘ideas’ per se unprotectible,
but this is justified by the greater public need for free access to ideas as
part of the democratic dialogue.” 22
On the other end, the dichotomy also plays a role in personality
rights theory, which sees copyright works as expressions of the
individuality or the personality of the author, thereby belonging by
nature to them. Authors can decide whether, in which form, and to what
extent to communicate their works to other people. By sharing works
with others through talking in public or publishing, authors’ ideas
become known to third parties. These third parties, in turn, make
permitted uses of the shared work, draw inspiration from them, and
even judge and criticize them. In this context, the idea-expression
dichotomy defines the boundaries between the author’s property and
the public’s ownership. 23
Another widely utilized internal set of tools are “permitted uses,”
also referred to as “exceptions and limitations” in the EU 24 and “fair use”
in the United States. 25 Bearing their own peculiarities, these statutorily
permitted uses are crucial in delineating the scope of copyright
protection. Nonetheless, it has been widely accepted that the fair use
doctrine is much more flexible than the regime of exceptions and
limitations dominating the EU copyright framework. 26 Thanks to such
Litman, supra note 17, at 993.
See Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 609
(1998) (“The idea-expression dichotomy has been characterized as a ‘hallowed principle
of copyright law’ and Professor Nimmer labelled it an ‘axiom of copyright law’ which
advanced a First Amendment value of limiting copyright protection in a manner
consistent with free expression.”).
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192 (1970).
19
20

21

22

Id.

Borghi, supra note 18, at 9 (“[A] shared work becomes ‘property of mankind’ and
acquires the status of a ‘twofold belonging’ (author on one side, mankind on the
other).”).
InfoSoc Directive, supra note 8.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
See Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece—The Liberation of European
Copyright Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 87, 90 (2010); Tito
23

24
25
26
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flexibility, the fair use doctrine has maintained the balance between free
speech and exclusive intellectual property rights in the form of copyright
while also allowing copyright law to adapt to technological
developments. 27 The doctrine has permitted the U.S. judiciary to
employ a flexible approach in determining the application of copyright
in response to social and technological changes. 28
That said, these two instruments are not the only internal tools
maintaining the balance between copyright law and fundamental rights.
The “tool-box of copyright” 29 comprises further means of balancing—
namely, the notion of a work of authorship that features the requirement
of originality; the scope of economic rights, such as the right of
reproduction and the right of communication to the public; the doctrine
of exhaustion (known as “the first-sale doctrine” in the United States);
and the limited term of protection, among others.
Outside of the copyright bubble, additional external safeguards
strive to maintain the equilibrium of copyright and fundamental rights.
These mechanisms are found in other branches of the law, such as
competition law—where compulsory licenses are usually imposed 30—and
bills of rights (or “laws on fundamental rights and freedoms” in the EU).
In relation to the latter, the most prominent instruments are the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights in the EU.
Notably, however, the internal and external mechanisms of
copyright regimes do not correspond strictly to two separate realms even
though it may seem so at first sight. In principle, it may appear that the
need to resort to an external balance arises when the internal
safeguards—here, the idea-expression dichotomy and permitted uses—
do not adequately carry out the balancing exercise between
rightsholders and the public. Along this line, a conflict between
instances grounded in copyright law would require the application of
internal safeguards, while a conflict rooted in different grounds—such as
copyright exclusive rights, on the one hand, and the freedom of
Rendas, Destereotyping the Copyright Wars: The “Fair Use vs Closed List” Debate in
the
EU,
SSRN
ELECTRONIC
J.
1,
8
(Sept.
8,
2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657482
[https://perma.cc/
MP3S-R6YH]; Guido Westkamp, The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations

in Europe: European Copyright Law Between Approximation and National Decision
Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 65 (2008).
See Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607,

27

1609 (2009).
Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381, 419 (2005).
P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT, AMSTERDAM L. SCH.
LEG. STUD. RES. PAP. 11–12 (2008).
Id. at 12.
28

29

30
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expression of copyright users of copyright material, on the other—would
necessitate the interaction of copyright legislation and human rights
norms.
Even though “the inside/outside location metaphor” may be
perceived as a distinction between the kinds of considerations required
to resolve a given dispute, 31 the case law in both the United States and
the EU demonstrates that fundamental rights considerations actually
fuel the internal safeguards and that such a distinction is extremely
blurred in practice. 32 The reason is that many of the so-called external
safeguards are already internalized in the copyright system through, for
example, permitted uses. This is certainly the case with limitations for
purposes such as news reporting, criticism, and parody, which, in the
fundamental rights arena, protect the freedom of expression and
information. 33 In some of these cases, however, there may still be room
for a balancing exercise between different rights and interests even if the
external aspect of the dispute is already internalized through the
adoption of an exception. 34 In other words, while exceptions aimed at
safeguarding the fundamental rights of information users 35 may be, at
first sight, considered internal safeguards—since they are encompassed
within copyright statutes—in reality, they are much more. As Professor
Drassinower points out, they can be considered “invitations to apply the
structure of proportionality to mediate claims arising in distinct legal
regimes.” 36
A typical instance where such internal balancing tools may fall short
of internalizing instances grounded in fundamental rights is when new
ways of expressing creativity arise or new technologies enable access to
creative works in ways not known before. 37 One such case, related to
digital sound sampling, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, was recently the
center of the CJEU’s attention. 38 In Pelham, the clash between copyright
law and the fundamental right of freedom of the arts became evident.
As such, the issue was whether the conflict between copyright and
Drassinower, supra note 15, at 230.
Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018); Case C‑469/17, Funke Medien
NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 60 (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? docid=216545&doclang=en.
P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, FIERCE CREATURES—COPYRIGHT EXEMPTIONS: TOWARDS
EXTINCTION?
11
(1997),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/PBHFierceCreatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYF2-NQGV].
Drassinower, supra note 15, at 222 (conceptualizing exceptions properly called “the
nexus of an encounter between copyright and other juridical interests”).
HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 29.
Drassinower, supra note 15, at 222.
Maria Lillà Montagnani, A New Interface Between Copyright Law and Technology:
How User-Generated Content Will Shape the Future of Online Distribution, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 719, 755 (2009).
Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, para. 16 (Dec. 12, 2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=208881&doclang=en.
31
32

33

34

35
36
37

38
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fundamental rights should be pushed outside the boundaries of the
copyright statute. The following sections study the approach to such
cases in the EU and the United States with the aim of locating the
balancing exercise—internally or externally.
III. THE UNITED STATES: INTERNAL BALANCING TAKES THE LEAD
One of the most well-known U.S. cases, where the balance of
copyright and fundamental rights played a crucial role, is Eldred v.
Ashcroft. 39 In this 2003 case, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a
constitutional challenge of the 1988 Copyright Term Extension Act. 40 In
its judgment, the Court upheld Harper & Row, 41 yet it also eased the way
for copyright law to fall, in certain circumstances, under First
Amendment scrutiny. 42
More precisely, the controversy concerned the extension of the
copyright term of protection under the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA), which, in line with the EU copyright duration, extended the
duration of copyright protection in the United States to the life of the
author plus seventy years. 43 Although this was not the first extension of
the term of protection, 44 this raised broad concerns from individuals and
businesses that utilized copyright works already in the public domain.
Indeed, the Act was accused of being a content-neutral regulation of
speech that failed to pass heightened judicial scrutiny. 45
The Supreme Court emphasized that one of the purposes of
copyright law is to promote free speech since its main objective is the
creation and publication of expression. 46 For this reason, the Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is compatible with the First Amendment
and in line with the “Framers’ view [that] copyright’s limited monopolies
are compatible with free speech principles.” 47 Besides, the Court
highlighted that copyright already “contains built-in First Amendment
39

537 U.S. 186 (2003).

40

Id. at 193.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that
the unauthorized use of an unpublished manuscript of a public figure has no basis in
the First Amendment, and its publication is not a “fair use” of the manuscript).
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
Id. at 195–96 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)).
See U.S. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831 Act) (extending
the term of copyright protection from fourteen to twenty-eight years); Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1080–1081 (1909 Act) (extending the renewed term
of a copyright from fourteen to twenty-eight years); U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. §§ 301–305 (1976 Act) (extending the term of copyright protection from twentyeight years to the lifetime of the author plus seventy years).
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–19 (rejecting the application of heightened scrutiny to evaluate
the measure as being “uncommon” for such content-neutral regulations).
Id. at 219.
41

42
43
44

45

46
47

Id.
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accommodations”—namely, the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine, 48 both analyzed below.
As to the idea-expression dichotomy, it “strikes a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and copyright law by permitting
free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.” 49 In this context, the fair use doctrine also plays a significant
role, allowing the use of “not only facts and ideas contained in a
copyrighted work, but also [of ]expression itself in certain
circumstances.” 50
Aside from reinforcing the principles of Harper & Row, the
Supreme Court, in Eldred, went further by affirming that a conflict
between copyright and free speech is not excludable. In that sense, it
maintained that while “[t]he First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s
speeches.” 51 Such scrutiny may, however, be possible only if Congress
altered “the traditional contours of copyright protection,” 52 which
apparently had not occurred in Eldred.
Despite the suggestion of a possible clash between copyright
protection and human rights, should Congress attempt to change the
traditional contours of copyright, further cases have yet to make such an
argument, suggesting by corollary that all current interventions in
copyright law are in line with the spirit of copyright and free speech
protection. Instead, U.S. cases that followed Eldred turned to the wellknown traditional internal safeguards, namely the idea-expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. Even if many of these claims could
have walked through the door implicitly opened by Eldred as potential
First Amendment infringements, the parties instead seemed to rely
entirely on the internal safeguards. Interestingly, in some cases even the
courts themselves, instead of recognizing a possible free-speechcopyright conflict, immediately referred to the boundaries that Eldred
built to dismiss such an assumption. As a result, the turning point that
Eldred could potentially create remains untested.
For example, Kahle v. Gonzales 53 examined a dispute similar to
that in Eldred with the CTEA under attack once again. 54 The plaintiffs
argued that the traditional contours of copyright law were altered,
thereby asking the court to determine whether there was a First
48
49

Id. at 219–20.
Id. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,

556 (1985)).

Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.; see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression—Reconciling Copyright and
the First Amendment, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 863, 873 (2016).

50
51
52

53

487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007).

54

Id. at 698.
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Amendment violation prerogative of those utilizing works already in the
public domain. 55 The Court, however, once again emphasized that
traditional internal safeguards—the idea-expression dichotomy and fair
use—were sufficient tools to vindicate the speech interests of those
affected. 56
The idea-expression dichotomy has continued to play a major role
as an internal safeguard in many cases. For example, following Professor
Melville Nimmer’s opinion that the idea-expression dichotomy
adequately serves the interests underlying both copyright law and
freedom of speech, the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 judgment in Bikram’s Yoga
College of India denied copyright protection to a sequence of yoga
poses. 57 While protection may be granted to “the particular selection
and arrangements of ideas, as well as a given specificity in the form of
their expression which warrants protection under the law of copyright,”
ideas fall on the free speech side, and are, therefore, free. 58
More specifically, the court considered the issue of whether twentysix yoga poses and two breathing exercises were copyright protectable
subject matter to be a question going to the core of the idea-expression
dichotomy, “a fundamental principle underlying constitutional and
statutory copyright protection.” 59 First, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals referred explicitly to § 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 60
whereby ideas, procedures, processes, and the like are excluded from
protection, regardless of the form in which they are described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied. 61 Second, it highlighted that the
idea-expression dichotomy “has two constitutional foundations: the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.” 62
In particular, the court noted that the copyright system was
established to promote the progress of science. 63 Referencing Feist, the
court explained that copyright grants authors exclusive rights over their
original expression but also ensures that others can freely utilize and
build upon ideas and information communicated by a work. 64 In
addition, the decision directly referred to Eldred to remind once again
that the idea-expression dichotomy constitutes a “built in First
Amendment accommodation,” 65 which, in the case at hand, had
55
56

Id.
Id. at 700.

Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th
Cir. 2015).
Nimmer, supra note 21, at 1190.
Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, 803 F.3d at 1034.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018).
Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, 803 F.3d at 1037.
57

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991)).
Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)).
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remained firmly in place, regardless of Congress’s responses to new
technologies and evolving understanding of creative expression. 66 In
other words, the court demonstrated that the dichotomy retains an
applicable role in maintaining constitutional limits even when copyright
categories expand.
Another case that offers an interesting perspective on the
application of the idea-expression dichotomy is the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Development,
where a creator of home designs brought a lawsuit against builders
alleging copyright infringement of architectural works and wholesale
copying. 67 The court held that although the defendant’s work shared the
style of the plaintiff, it nonetheless took nothing from the original
expression since an important distinction is to be made between copying
and wrongful copying—two elements very often confused. 68
The decision pointed out that “[n]ot every portion or aspect of a
copyrighted work is given copyright law’s protection.” 69 Moreover, “the
history [a work] describes, the facts it mentions, and the ideas it
embraces, are in the public domain free for others to draw upon.” 70 It is
instead the peculiar expressions of that history, those facts, and those
ideas that belong exclusively to their author. 71 Eventually, what was
deemed to be copied in Zalewsky were just the unprotected elements of
the original designs, which were a function of consumer expectations,
standard house design, and the design features of a particular house
style. 72 Colonial homes possess certain design conventions that must be
followed and, in Zalewsky, were definitely followed by the builders. 73
For these reasons, the court concluded that the copyright was very thin,
and only a very close copying would have constituted infringement. 74
Another important case is the well-known dispute in Williams v.
Gaye. 75 In Williams, the estate of Marvin Gaye brought a copyright
infringement claim against Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, among
others, based on similarities between Marvin Gaye’s song “Got To Give
It Up” and Pharrell Williams’s and Robin Thicke’s song “Blurred
Lines.” 76 The music industry and academia highly criticized the

66

Id. at 1044.

Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 100; see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:164.10 (2019)
(explaining the differences between “copying” and “wrongful copying”).
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 100.
Id. at 102.

67
68

69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 107.

75

Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018).

76

Id. at 1159.
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judgment. 77 However, the most striking disapproval of the majority’s
opinion came from the dissenting voice of Judge Nguyen. By reference
to Eldred and Bikram’s Yoga, Judge Nguyen underlined that if it were
not for the freedom to borrow others’ ideas and express them in new
ways, artists would not come up with new works, and this would be of
great detriment to our society, which will see a decrease in creativity and
works of art. 78
Eventually, all these cases demonstrate the point eloquently
expressed by Professor Nimmer already in 1970: “while the
idea/expression dichotomy may come in the way of free speech, it is
nevertheless justified as it facilitates the democratic dialogue.” 79
The other internal safeguard to free speech proposed by Eldred is
the fair use doctrine. Originally rooted in case law, this is now codified
in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. 80 Described as the most
important and far reaching safeguard to free speech, fair use acts as a
defense to copyright infringement and shields users from copyright
infringement liability. 81 Justice Story’s words from 1841, that “a fair and
bona fide abridgement of an original work is not a piracy,” 82 laid the
foundation for the modern fair use doctrine, which now includes four
factors weighed in light of the purposes of copyright law. 83 Because of its
roots in equity, the fair use doctrine is inherently open to interpretation,
and this produces most case law within the context of copyright
defenses. 84
In order to appreciate fair use’s interaction with free speech, one
should, again, trace the jurisprudence. For example, in A & M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.—an important decision pre-dating the Eldred case—
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the claim that
See Yvette Joy Liebesman, Revisiting Innovative Technologies to Determine
Substantial Similarity in Musical Composition Infringement Lawsuits, 59 IDEA 157,
77

171 (2018).
Williams, 885 F.3d at 1184–85 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
Nimmer, supra note 21, at 1192.
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1–36
(1987) (explaining how fair use policies strike a balance between the economic rights of
the copyright holder, the dissemination of ideas, and the learning function of
copyrighted material).
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11 (1990); Shira Perlmutter & W.F.
Patry, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L. J. 667, 685–87 (1993)).
See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (explaining that, in the twenty-eight years from the
January 1, 1978, effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act to the year 2005, there were
306 reported federal court opinions from 215 cases that made substantial use of section
107’s four-factor test).
78
79
80
81

82
83

84
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defendant’s First Amendment rights were infringed by virtue of
plaintiff’s preliminary injunction request. 85 The case concerned the
contributory and vicarious liability of Napster, a peer-to-peer file sharing
platform. 86 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Napster liable,
rejected the argument that Napster users were covered by fair use, and
did not even begin to analyze Napster’s First Amendment claim. 87
Following Eldred, two further cases decided by the federal courts
of appeals demonstrate once again that the judiciary has always deemed
the fair use doctrine an adequate internal safeguard of the copyright
system, obviating any reference to First Amendment concerns. In 2006,
a case involved the famous visual artist, Jeff Koons, who was accused of
copyright infringement by the photographer Andrea Blanch. 88 For one
of his projects, Easyfun-Ethereal, Jeff Koons collected images from
advertisements, which he then scanned and digitally superimposed
against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes. 89 The resulting work,
Niagara, depicted four pairs of women’s feet and lower legs, confections
such as a chocolate fudge brownies, donuts and pastries, and the Niagara
Falls in the background. 90 One of the images of the pairs of legs was
taken from a photograph by the plaintiff. 91 As a professional fashion
photographer, Andrea Blanch had shot the photograph as part of an
advertisement for Allure magazine. 92 She claimed copyright
infringement since the photo was used without her authorization.
The court, however, ruled that Koons’s use was fair, and he did
not infringe the copyright of the photographer since the two works had
a different objective. 93 More precisely, Koons’ work was deemed to be
transformative. 94 While Blanch aimed at depicting the “erotic sense” and
“sexuality” of the photographs, 95 Koons had juxtaposed women’s legs
against a backdrop of food and landscape in order to comment on how
some of our most basic appetites as a society are mediated by popular
images, 96 and to “satirize life . . . when seen through the prism of slick
fashion photography. 97
Indeed, subsequent jurisprudence followed the same line of
reasoning—using a copyrighted expression as raw material and
85

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2001).

86

Id. at 1010–1011.
Id. at 1027–28.

87
88

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006).

89

Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 247–48.
Id.
Id. at 252–53.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 247, 261.
Id. at 255.

90
91
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93
94
95
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transforming it into new information, new aesthetics, insights, and
understandings is the precise type of activity that the fair use doctrine
strives to protect with the aim of enriching our society. 98 A transformative
use, whereby something new is inserted with a novel purpose, changes
and alters the first work by conferring on it a new expression, meaning,
or message, which is precisely the free speech aspect that one would aim
to safeguard.
Interestingly, Koons never mentioned the First Amendment. Still,
when one looks at the cases to identify their objective, the free speech
concerns somehow crystallize. Indeed, saying that Koons used an earlier
image as “fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic
consequences of mass media” 99 is just another way of saying that artists
exercise their free speech prerogative in an attempt to satirize the culture
and attitudes promoted in mass media.
In another fair use case, Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals approved an allegedly infringing work because it represented
a new expression employing new aesthetics with creative and
communicative features. 100 There, photographer Patrick Cariou sued the
world-famous appropriation artist, Richard Prince, for incorporating
thirty of Cariou’s Rastafarian photographs in an exhibition. 101 When
assessing the transformative nature of the work, the court found it
important that the work presented a new aesthetic and that Prince’s
paintings would reasonably be perceived as different from Cariou’s
photographs. 102 Indeed, Cariou’s photographs were black-and-white and
9 ½” x 12,” 103 while Prince’s works were in color, included distorted
human forms, and were between ten and a hundred times the size of
the original photographs. 104 The composition, presentation, scale, color
palette, and media of Prince’s work were fundamentally different and
“new” compared to Cariou’s photographs, meaning the expressive
nature of Prince’s work was different. 105 This seemed to be the decisive
aspect and could be considered a form of expressive freedom for which
the fair use doctrine was implicated in the case.
In Cariou, the court, by leniently assessing transformative purpose,
permitted the Prince’s work to overcome the hurdle of fair use, as it
transformed the copyrighted work into “something new,” without
actually specifying what this new something was. 106 This demonstrates
See id. at 251–52 (citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 253.
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 698–99.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 706.

98
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102
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Id.
Id. at 706.
See id. at 710.
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that the internal safeguard of free speech, in the context of the fair use
doctrine, can be very flexible and far reaching. Consequently, in U.S.
jurisprudence, internal safeguards—namely the idea-expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine—govern the interaction between
copyright and human rights.
In addition to these mechanical internal balancing instruments,
U.S. courts tend to resort to the “shared goal argument” as another
substantive internal safeguard. 107 According to this argument, both
copyright and free speech aim at promoting progress 108—the former
provides incentives for the production of speech, while the latter is
responsible for protecting that production. 109 In doing so, they take
different routes to achieve the same goal of promoting speech, which is
supplemented by the division of labor argument. 110 In such a case, a
conflict between copyright and free speech rarely arises, as the copyright
system itself is more than equipped to accommodate free speech.
IV. THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU: DANCING TO THE
CHARTER’S TUNE?
In the EU, concerns for the functioning of the EU’s internal
market have traditionally driven legislative action in the field of
copyright. 111 Thus, the need to harmonize copyright laws with directives
and regulations emerges whenever differences in the legislations of the
Member States risk jeopardizing the free movement of goods and
services. 112 The key provisions in this respect are Articles 26 and 114 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. These two legal
bases are rather general in their wording. The former broadly states that
the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring
the functioning of the internal market, while the latter entails the specific
107

See Michael Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View, in COPYRIGHT

HUMAN RIGHTS—FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—
PRIVACY 37, 46, 49–50, 60 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004) (explaining and providing
examples of courts using the “shared goal argument”).
See Greg A. Perry, Copyright and the First Amendment: Nurturing the Seeds for
Harvest: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (1985), 65
NEB. L. REV. 631, 652 (1986) (“[C]opyright and the first amendment serve the same
laudable purpose–the fullest possible dissemination of ideas and information for the
ultimate benefit of the general public.”).
See PAUL L.C. TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(3d ed. 2015).
Birnhack, supra note 107, at 46, 49.
See ELEONORA ROSATI, COPYRIGHT AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 10 (2019); Maria José Schmidt-Kessen, EU Digital Single Market Strategy,
AND
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109

110
111

Digital Content and Geo-Blocking: Costs and Benefits of Partitioning EU’s Internal
Market, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 561, 570–71 (2018) (explaining the conflict between
territorial copyright restrictions and the EU’s efforts to create an internal market).
ROSATI, supra note 111.
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EU legislative procedure for achieving that aim, namely the ordinary
legislative procedure. 113
This legal arrangement has produced a long list of directives and
regulations in the field of EU copyright law in a highly fragmented
manner. Consequently, when it comes to copyright disputes, Member
States are now in a situation where the law to be applied is a hodgepodge
of EU and national law. 114 Such a piecemeal harmonization often leads
to situations in which national courts are obliged to apply a provision of
EU law, yet are somewhat unclear as to the interpretation of the
provision. Certain norms are not precisely defined in EU laws because
Member States struggle to reach political agreement on key notions,
and, at the same time, the EU legislature has intentionally left certain
concepts undefined in order to avoid the need for political
compromises. 115 Inevitably, what happens in these circumstances is that
the national courts, unsure of how to interpret various EU norms, stays
the proceedings and refers specific questions for guidance to the CJEU.
This procedure is called “preliminary reference.” 116 By providing its
interpretation of the unclear norm at stake, the CJEU has taken up the
task of filling in the apparent gaps 117 and defining certain notions as
autonomous concepts of EU law to further the harmonization agenda. 118
This has led some scholars to characterize the court as a co-legislator. 119
The conflict between copyright and fundamental rights
materializes in front of the CJEU as a result of preliminary references
by national courts. In fact, this happens quite often. 120 In this process of
interpretation of the legislative acquis, the CJEU has regularly referred
to the Charter as a guiding principle to such an extent that academics

ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 (2d ed. 2015).
Niilo Jääskinen, Europeanisation of National Law: A Legal-Theoretical Analysis, 40
EUR. L. REV. 667, 668 (2015).
Vincent Cassiers & Alain Strowel, Intellectual Property Law Made by the Court of
Justice of the European Union, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 175,
178 (Christophe Geiger, Craig Allen Nard, & Xavier Seuba eds., 2018).
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47,
163.
Jonathan Griffiths, Taking Power Tools to the Acquis—the Court of Justice, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Union Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 144, 144 (Christophe Geiger, Craig Allen Nard, &
Xavier Seuba eds., 2018); see also Cassiers and Strowel, supra note 115, at 183–85.
ROSATI, supra note 112, at 79; PAUL TORREMANS & IRINI STAMATOUDI, EU
COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 11 (2014).
Cassiers & Strowel, supra note 115.
Bernd Justin Jütte & João Pedro Quintais, Conference on Freedom of Expression
and Copyright: Luxembourg, 7 November 2019, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Sept. 24,
2019), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/09/24/conference-on-freedom-ofexpression-and-copyright-luxembourg-7-november-2019/
[https://perma.cc/T9WNR4P5].
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have labelled this development the “constitutionalization” of IP law. 121
The need to balance copyright law with other fundamental rights has
emerged primarily in the context of economic rights, 122 exceptions and
limitations, 123 and intermediaries’ liability for third parties’ copyright
infringement online. 124 Despite these numerous instances in which
concerns for fundamental rights formed part of the court’s judgment,
the CJEU does not always delve deep into the discussion of balancing
copyright and fundamental rights. The two areas in which this discussion
has indeed taken place more evidently are the cases on intermediaries’
liability and, more recently, the field of exceptions and limitations. For
that reason, this analysis focuses on these two subjects.
See Griffiths, supra note 117, at 144; see also Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising”
Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual
Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 371,
371 (2006); Jonathan Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of
Justice, the Right to Property and European Copyright Law, 38 EUR. L. REV. 65, 65
(2013) [hereinafter Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?]; Tuomas Mylly, The
Constitutionalisation of the European Legal Order: Impact of Human Rights on
Intellectual Property in the EU, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
121

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103, 103 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
See Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=175626&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 E.C.R. I8093;.
See, e.g., Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck (Jan. 10, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209682&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (Dec. 12, 2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208881&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland
(Oct.
25,
2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-201/13,
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen (May 22, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=152656&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-145/10,
Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533; Case C-467/08, Padawan SL
v. SGAE, 2010 E.C.R. I-10055.
See, e.g., Case C-484/14, Tobias McFadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany
GmbH (Mar. 16, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text
=&docid=175130&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien
GmbH
v.
Constantin
Film
Verleih
GmbH
(Nov.
26,
2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144944&page
Index=0&doclang=EN; Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB v. Perfect Communication
Sweden
AB
(Nov.
17,
2011),
http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=114613&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81776&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU (July 18,
2007), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=62901&page
Index=0&doclang=EN.
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Before exploring these two areas of copyright law further, we need
to map out the tools that the court uses in its analysis. The first tool in
the EU is the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which bears the status of
primary law. 125 A strong peculiarity of the Charter, without a counterpart
in the United States, is Article 17(2), which boldly affirms that
intellectual property shall be protected. For that reason, the first section
below explores the status of IP as a fundamental right. On the basis of
this premise, the next two parts then turn to the jurisprudence of the
CJEU on intermediaries’ liability and permitted uses respectively, where
the CJEU was prompted to take fundamental rights concerns into
account.

A. Intellectual Property as a Fundamental Right
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the EU became an integral part of the EU
legal order, enjoying the status of the founding treaties, with primacy
over secondary EU law, namely directives and regulations. The most
relevant fundamental right in the discourse on copyright law is the right
of property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. The text of the
Charter goes even further by stating, in Article 17(2), that intellectual
property shall be protected. Such a bold statement, described by
academics as a “mysterious provision with an unclear scope,” 126 is
certainly not to be considered as granting IP some “special superprotected status,” but just as a confirmation that Article 17(1) shall also
include the right of IP. 127 Therefore, considering that the right to
property is not an absolute right but has a qualified status and, as such,
may be restricted in light of general interest, 128 the same is applicable to
Article 17(2) in the context of intellectual property. Indeed, the CJEU
case law that followed confirms this position. 129 In any case, even prior
to the Charter, IP was, as part of the right of property, already
considered a fundamental right under the European Convention of
Human Rights. 130
Consequently, given the fundamental nature of IP rights, when a
copyright case is referred to the CJEU, the court ought to ascertain the
legitimacy of the measures required to prevent copyright infringement
125
126

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 8.
Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall be Protected?! Article 17(2) of the

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with
an Unclear Scope, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113, 113 (2009).
Griffiths, supra note 117, at 151.
See Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-4980.
See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 43.
See Peter Oliver & Christopher Stothers, Intellectual Property Under the Charter:
Are the Court’s Scales Properly Calibrated?, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 517, 520
127
128
129
130

(2017).
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in light of the other fundamental rights protected under the Charter—
mainly, freedom of expression, but also the right to privacy and the
freedom to conduct business. All of these human rights are equal and,
thus, none can prevail automatically over the others. 131
Interestingly, the Charter itself encompasses how to carry out this
assessment—the proportionality test. 132 Referred to as a “mega” or
“golden” standard in European copyright law, 133 the test is rooted in
German administrative law. 134 It has now spread to other fields and refers
to the understanding that constitutional rights are relative and not
absolute and, therefore, should be balanced against each other. 135
Today, the test is regularly called upon to outline the constitutional
limits of a particular norm in a democratic society. 136 In the context of
EU copyright law, the test has been employed as a general principle of
EU law and also as a principle enshrined in the EU copyright directives
themselves. 137
Four steps traditionally form the proportionality test: “proper
purpose, rational connection, necessary means[,] and a proper relation
between the benefit gained by realizing the proper purpose and the
harm caused to the constitutional right.” 138 In other words, after
establishing the legitimacy of the pursued objective, 139 one then turns to
the principle of suitability, also called the principle of appropriateness. 140
At this stage, the question becomes whether the measure chosen is
suitable to pursue the legitimate objective. The measure would be

Peggy Ducoulombier, Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights: An Overview, in CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL

131

RIGHTS 217, 234 (Eva Brems ed., 2008).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1, 28.
See Orit Fischman Afori, Proportionality—A New Mega Standard in European
Copyright Law, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 889, 892 (2014); Alain
Strowel & Hee-Eun Kim, The Balancing Impact of General EU Law on European
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 112 (Justine Pila &
Ansgar Ohly eds., 2013).
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality, Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 75 (2008).
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS 177 (2012).
VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 40
(2013).
ROSATI, supra note 112, at 45.
BARAK, supra note 135, at 131.
Wolf Sauter, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?, 15 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR.
LEGAL STUD. 439, 448 (2013); Stone Sweet and Matthews, supra note 134, at 76.
Sauter, supra note 139, at 448–49; see also Case C-331/88, R v. Ministry of Agric.,
Fisheries and Food, 1990 E.C.R. I-4023.
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suitable if it possesses a minimum degree of effectiveness. 141 Next is the
principle of necessity, also dubbed as strict necessity, which requires that
no other equally suitable, less restrictive measure is available. 142
Traditionally, at this stage, the chosen measure should not restrict the
right more than it is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective. 143 The
final step is proportionality in the narrow sense (stricto sensu), whereby
the measure should not disrupt the fair balance between the conflicting
rights or destroy the essence of the right that is restricted. 144 At this final
stage, the actual balancing takes place. The benefit gained by the
purpose of the law is weighed against the harm caused to the
fundamental right. 145 This last stage creates a relationship by balancing
without damaging the core of the fundamental right. 146 The four
elements of the test, while evaluated separately, eventually come to
function as communicating vessels. 147
Against this background, it has been observed that, in the
contemporary digital environment, it is particularly difficult to reconcile
fundamental rights—such as freedom of expression, privacy, data
protection, and freedom to conduct business—with copyright law as a
fundamental right of its own. 148 The proportionality test outlined above
is often combined with a reference to the need to strike a fair balance
between different rights and interests. 149
When one turns to analyze the copyright case law of the CJEU,
two fields stand out: intermediaries’ liability and permitted uses. The
former pertains to the balancing of many crucial fundamental rights.
From the point of view of the copyright holder, the right to property
under Article 17 of the Charter is key, which, as observed, also covers
copyright. From the point of view of internet users, on the other hand,
JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: A STUDY OF PROPORTIONALITY,
SUBSIDIARITY AND PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
96 (2009); Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 134, at 76.
Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 134, at 75 (“[T]he core of necessity analysis is the
deployment of a ‘least-restrictive means’ (LRM) test: the judge ensures that the measure
does not curtail the right any more than is necessary for the government to achieve its
stated goals.”).
Id. at 76.
BARAK, supra note 135, at 131–33, 340–70; CHRISTOFFERSEN, supra note 141, at 19–
20.
BARAK, supra note 135, at 343.
Peter Teunissen, The Balance Puzzle: The ECJ’s Method of Proportionality Review
in EU Copyright Law, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV, 579, 582 (2018).
141
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Id.

Sari Depreeuw, Irina Baraliuc & Serge Gutwirth, Copyright Enforcement in the
Digital Age: A Post-ACTA View on the Balancing of Fundamental Rights, 21 INT. J.L.
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INF. TECH. 92, 92 (2013).
ROSATI, supra note 112, at 50 (stating that sometimes the fair balance is actually an
expression of the proportionality assessment as opposed to a self-standing standard of
its own).
149

2020]

COPYRIGHT & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE BALLROOM 633

the freedom of information pursuant to Article 11 and the protection of
personal data under Article 8 are discussed, especially when injunctions,
coupled with the imposition of filtering measures, are concerned. 150
Finally, from the intermediaries’ perspective, the freedom to conduct
business under Article 16 is often implicated. 151 Such a wide diversity of
fundamental rights necessitates a fair balance assessment between many
different interests since, in these cases, the relevant secondary legislation
does not deal explicitly with the intersection of copyright and
fundamental rights. 152
The second category of cases, that of permitted uses, has come
under the detailed scrutiny of the CJEU in three very recent Grand
Chamber judgments. 153 Also referred to as “the triad,” 154 these cases
focus on the nature of balancing—internal or external—and pertain to the
brittle interaction between exceptions and limitations in EU law and
exclusive economic rights. For these reasons, the following sections dive
deep into the reasoning of the court and underpin its leading
methodology. In all cases, the Charter does indeed figure as a relevant
element in the discussion. Yet, very often, the actual balancing exercise
lacks sound methodology, an approach Professor Peukert describes as
“ad hoc balancing lacking a clear transparent normative framework.” 155

B. Intermediaries’ Liability Cases
Because the field is entirely characterized by technology, the cases
regarding online intermediaries’ liability have attracted particularly high
See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et
éditeurs (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 50 (noting that implementation of a
filtering system may infringe on internet users’ rights under Articles 8 and 11 of the
Charter).
Id. paras. 46–49 (noting that a fair balance must be struck between the intellectual
property rights of copyright holders and the freedom to conduct business under Article
16 of the Charter).
Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?, supra note 121, at 72.
See Case C‑469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(July
29,
2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck (July 29, 2019)
http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209682&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case
C-476/17,
Pelham
GmbH
v.
Hütter
(July
29,
2019),
http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=208881&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
Caterina Sganga, A Decade of Fair Balance Doctrine, and How to Fix It: Copyright
150

151

152
153

154

Versus Fundamental Rights Before the CJEU from Promusicae to Funke Medien,
Pelham and Spiegel Online, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 683, 690 (2019).
Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
155

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 135 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
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levels of attention as far as the balancing of different interests are
concerned. In 2008, the first such case before the CJEU involved
remedies for copyright enforcement. 156 Promusicae, the Spanish
copyright collecting society for the record industry, brought to court
Telefónica, a Spanish internet access provider, in an attempt to disclose
the identities and physical addresses of users exchanging files through
the peer-to-peer file sharing platform, KaZaA. 157 The CJEU was
particularly brief in discussing the substance of these rights and the
application of the proportionality principle. The court’s starting point,
however, was that Member States should maintain a fair balance
between the right to property, the right to privacy, and data protection
in the transposition of the directives at stake. 158 To do that, national
courts must interpret national law in line with general principles of the
law, such as, proportionality. 159 The court, however, limited itself only to
this rather brief remark and did not delve into the steps of the
proportionality test. This was in line with the court’s approach in
L’Oreal v. eBay, where the court was similarly succinct in its elaboration
of the proportionality test but in the context of trademark law. 160 The
CJEU in Promusicae left it to the national court to expand upon its own
understanding of fair balance. 161 It seems as though Member States are
presumed to be familiar with the peculiarities of the test without the
necessity of any further guidance by the CJEU.
Next, the court dealt with two cases that concerned the
requirement to install a filtering system to monitor user activity to
prevent the presence of copyright infringing material. The copyright and
fundamental rights intersection came to the limelight in the context of
internet service providers’ and hosting providers’ liability in Scarlet
Extended 162 and Netlog 163 respectively. These two cases were eventually
joined. While the former concerned an internet service provider and
the latter a hosting provider, both eventually turned on the question of
whether an intermediary is required to install a filtering system to
monitor the activity of its users and prevent copyright infringing material
from appearing on its services. 164 Various fundamental rights were at
stake—namely, the copyright holders’ right to intellectual property, the
intermediaries’ freedom to conduct business , and the users’ freedom
156

Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271.

157

Id. para. 30.
Id. para. 54.
Id.
See Case C-324/09, L’Oreal v. eBay, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, paras. 143–44.

158
159
160

Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, para.
68.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959.
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
Id. para. 26; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 36.

161

162
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of information and right to data protection. 165 The court ruled out the
possibility of imposing such an obligation upon the intermediary as that
would have directly clashed with Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce
Directive, which explicitly bans the imposition of general monitoring
obligations upon intermediaries. 166
Moreover, the court made an important reference to the need to
fairly balance different rights. In that sense, the court eventually held
that an injunction of the kind sought in the case would seriously interfere
with the freedom of the intermediary to conduct business since it would
impose on the intermediary an obligation to install a complicated and
costly system at the intermediary’s own expense. 167 Furthermore, the
Enforcement Directive also prevented the imposition of such an
injunction, as the obligation would have been unnecessarily complicated
or costly. 168 Therefore, the court was not convinced that the proposed
measure would satisfy the fair balance between the opposing
fundamental rights. 169
In the next case in this wave, the court focused its attention on a
claim brought by the film producers Constantin Film Verleih GmbH
and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft GmbH, who targeted the
website kino.to, which provided access to large amounts of copyrighted
works. 170 The crux of the case was whether the Austrian internet service
provider, UPC Telekabel, should have introduced a measure to block
access to the website. 171 At stake was a so-called “outcome prohibition,”
whereby the intermediary would be required to take all necessary
measures to prevent a certain outcome. In its reasoning, the court
reiterated the importance of balancing the various rights at stake. 172 The
first balancing the court carried out was between the rightsholders’ right
to intellectual property and the intermediaries’ freedom to conduct
business. 173 The second was between the right of intellectual property
holders and the freedom of information of the users. 174
Case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 1; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R.
I-11959, paras. 1–4.
Case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 38; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R.
I-11959, para. 112.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 48.
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3(1),
2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 20.
Case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 51.
Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH
(Mar.
27,
2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex
=0&doclang=en.
Id. para. 2.
Id. para. 46.
Id. para. 63.
165
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Id.
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Regarding the balance between the freedom to conduct business
and intellectual property rights, the court held that this type of injunction
“does not seem to infringe the very substance of the freedom of an
internet service provider.” 175 In all cases, before the balancing exercise is
carried out, the court must outline the actual substance of the
fundamental right at stake. Freedom to conduct business was
understood as the right of “any business to be able to freely use, within
the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economics, technical and
financial resources available to it.” 176 In the present case, since the
intermediary had the freedom to determine the measure in order to
achieve the outcome sought, the freedom to conduct business was not
sacrificed. 177 The court, however, did not address the actual balancing
required in the first context., Instead the court shifted the task to the
shoulders of the intermediary by holding that “when the addressee of
an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings chooses the
measures to be adopted in order to comply with that injunction, he must
ensure compliance with the fundamental right of internet users to
freedom of information.” 178
Surprisingly, the intermediary itself must do the balancing as well,
not only the national authorities. This is in sync with the recent
legislative pushes in the EU to make intermediaries more responsible
for the content they host. 179 Nevertheless, even though intermediaries
are often the gatekeepers of information online, 180 it is questionable
whether they are best positioned to balance the different fundamental
rights at stake in the context of tackling copyright infringement online. 181
Id. paras. 50–51.
Id. para. 49.
Id. paras. 52–53.
Id.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Tackling Illegal Content Online—Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online
Platforms, COM (2017) 555 final (Sept. 28, 2017); Maria Lillà Montagnani & Alina
Yordanova Trapova, Safe Harbours in Deep Waters: A New Emerging Liability Regime
for Internet Intermediaries in the Digital Single Market, 26 INT. J.L. INFO. TECH. 294,
175
176
177
178
179

(studying the trend of making intermediaries more responsible in the context of
copyright content and audio-visual media services) (2018).
Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J. L. TECH. 253, 253
(2006); see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), THE ROLE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES IN ADVANCING PUBLIC POLICY
OBJECTIVES: FORGING PARTNERSHIPS FOR ADVANCING POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE
INTERNET ECONOMY, PART II, DSTI/ICCP(2010)11/FINAL, at 5 (2011),
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/48685066.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7HSWNRT].
See Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright
Enforcement Online: Elaborating A Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32 AM.
U. L. REV. 44, 93 (2016).
180
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In the balance between freedom of information of users and
intellectual property rights, the CJEU was more diligent in its reference
to the three steps of proportionality that the intermediary should
undertake. 182 As far as the legitimate aim was concerned, the court
emphasized that the measure adopted by the intermediary should
strictly target infringing activity without impinging on users’ lawful use of
the services to access information. 183 To ensure appropriateness of the
measure, the measure should be “sufficiently effective to ensure genuine
protection of the fundamental right at issue.” 184 In that sense, the
measure should “have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to
the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve
and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services
of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter
made available to them in breach of that fundamental right.” 185
As far as the necessity step was concerned, the court briefly
mentioned that the adopted measure should not unnecessarily deprive
users of the possibility to lawfully access the information available. 186 The
actual balancing in the last stage of the proportionality test was not
carried out, but the court nevertheless concluded that there was a fair
balance between the freedom of information and the right to intellectual
property. 187 Although the court’s weighing of the interests remained
brief, some have suggested that this was expected given the outcome
prohibition at stake. 188
Next, in McFadden, the operator of an open wireless network, who
sold and leased sound and lighting systems, found himself in court when
Sony Music served him a formal notice because an anonymous user had
downloaded infringing content via McFadden’s Wi-Fi network. 189
McFadden operated a Wi-Fi network free-of-charge, permitting anyone
to log in without registering or revealing personal data. 190 He insisted that
he was shielded from liability due to the safe harbor exemption of
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. 191 On this point, McFadden
was successful, as the safe harbor exemption was upheld, and no
See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH,
para. 63 (Mar. 27, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=0&doclang=en .
Id. para. 56.
Id. para. 62.
182

183
184
185
186
187

Id.
Id. para. 56.
Id. paras. 63–65.

Oliver and Stothers, supra note 130, at 557.
Case C-484/14, Tobias McFadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH
(Sept. 15, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
175130&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
Id. para. 23.
Id. para. 33.
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damages could be awarded. 192 Yet, another remedy—an injunction—was
still on the table. Upon referral from the national court, three possible
remedies were discussed. 193 Each was examined by the CJEU in turn,
providing the first case to date where the CJEU thoroughly applied the
proportionality analysis.
First, it was proposed that all information passing through the
internet connection be monitored by the internet service provider. 194
Since this was in direct clash with Article 15 of the E-Commerce
Directive that banned general monitoring activities, it was quickly
dismissed. The second option was to terminate the internet access. 195
Since this was not at odds with the prohibition on general monitoring,
the relevant rights—namely, McFadden’s freedom to conduct business
and Sony Music’s right to intellectual property—were weighted. 196 The
court held that absent the consideration of less restrictive measures, the
decision to terminate the service provider’s internet connection would
seriously impinge on McFadden’s freedom to conduct business. 197 In
other words, the court ruled that, since there were less restrictive
measures that had not been evaluated, termination of internet access
would be improper.
The third option was password protecting the network. 198 Two
possible clashes with fundamental rights were discussed here. On the
one hand, there was a potential problem with restricting McFadden’s
freedom to conduct business, while on the other hand, users’ right to
freedom of information would have been affected. 199
Unlike UPC Telekabel, the court itself performed the balancing,
instead of shifting the obligation to the intermediary. In the context of
the freedom to conduct business, the court ruled that a fair balance was
struck, as the essence of the right to conduct business was not affected. 200
All that was required was a slight adjustment of one of the technical
options available, namely to password protect the Wi-Fi network. 201
Regarding the users’ freedom of information, the court held that
protecting the network with a password would not clash with the
objective of the measure since such a technical restriction would not
constitute an outright block to all internet access. 202 As for the suitability
requirement, the court followed the familiar line of reasoning, whereby
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id. para. 65.
Id. paras. 85–99.
Id. para. 87.
Id. para. 88.
Id. paras. 88–89.
Id.
Id. para. 90.
Id.
Id. para. 94.
Id. paras. 91–92.
Id. para. 94.
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the effectiveness of the chosen measure should be capable of at least
making it difficult for users to infringe copyright or seriously discourage
them from doing so. 203 Hence, a password restriction was a suitable
solution since users would have to reveal their identity and could not act
anonymously to obtain the required password. 204
From the three possible remedies, password protection was
deemed a necessary measure, which made the discussion of this step
rather brief. Moving onto the balancing exercise as part of the
proportionality stricto sensu step, the court found that securing an
internet connection did not appear to undermine the essence of users’
right to freedom of information as long as it was limited to a password
requirement. 205
The crux of the court’s analysis was preserving the essence of the
fundamental rights concerned. Should the line be crossed and the
essence of these rights be violated, the benefits of the pursued aim would
be outweighed by the harm done to conflicting fundamental rights. 206
Surprisingly, even though McFadden seems to be the most elaborate
application of the proportionality test, it still failed to consider the wider
picture of fundamental rights involved since the right to private life
pursuant to Article 7 of the Charter and data protection under Article 8
of the Charter were entirely excluded from the analysis. Since the
chosen remedy of password protection required users to reveal
personal, indefinable information, users’ concerns should have been
taken into consideration.
Consequently, whenever copyright law and fundamental rights
norms clash in the context of intermediaries, the dispute is resolved by
reference to external copyright safeguards, namely the Charter, also
dubbed an “explicit constitutional constraint on copyright.” 207 In these
cases, unlike the category of permitted uses evaluated below,
fundamental rights act as an autonomous ground to limit specific
enforcement measures. What is evident, however, is that the
proportionality analysis albeit invoked by the CJEU and explicitly
required by the directives, is only applied superficially. Further, the test
has been widely criticized by academics as inappropriate because it
positions the right to property against all other rights, resting on the
presumption that all fundamental rights are equal and, thereby, merely
replacing one ambiguity with another without any true guidance. 208 The
203
204
205
206
207

Id. para. 96.
Id. paras. 91–92.
Id. para. 92.
Teunissen, supra note 146, at 591.
Afori, supra note 133, at 911.

ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL
IMPACT 187–91 (2005); see also Afori, supra note 133, at 909; Depreeuw, Baraliuc, &
Gutwirth, supra note 148, at 92.
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structure and clarity needed to improve the test can come only through
consistency in the judgments, but to date, such consistency is lacking. 209
While the CJEU does not apply the proportionality test in its
complete form in most cases, one can forgive the court for not providing
full guidance, as the fair balance test is heavily fact specific. This is
sometimes seen as a positive facet, allowing the courts to transform a
complex, principle-based conflict into a primarily factual one that
facilitates pragmatic solutions. 210 However, at the same time, the EU
legislature should have been clearer and more consistent when drafting
legislation fit for information society services. 211 Some authors suggest
that copyright always had to strike a balance between the competing
interests of authors, intermediaries, and the public, which made vesting
large discretion to the courts the most appropriate course. 212
In any case, the true problem arises when the court attempts to
apply the proportionality test—as in McFadden—but omits some
important fundamental rights from the analysis. This is how the
proportionality test becomes “without further elucidation, vacuous and
unhelpful.” 213 Other authors argue that the reason for such superficial
application of the proportionality test lies in the CJEU’s very selective
reference to fundamental rights in these cases, to the extent that the
CJEU has been accused of referring to fundamental rights only when
they support an interpretation already reached by recourse to other
interpretative methods. 214

C. Exceptions and Limitations Cases
The other category of copyright cases under the fundamental rights
radar pertains to exceptions and limitations, i.e. permitted uses. While
in Painer 215 and Deckmyn, 216 the CJEU strictly focused on internal
balancing as instructed by recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive, three
recent cases from the CJEU’s Grand Chamber question whether the
balancing can take place outside the boundaries of copyright legislation.
On July 29, 2019, the CJEU delivered three much-awaited
judgments bearing on the relationship between copyright law and

Oliver & Stothers, supra note 130, at 546.
Afori, supra note 133, at 910.
See Oliver & Stothers, supra note 130, at 565.
See Afori, supra note 133, at 892.
Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?, supra note 121, at 74.
See Mylly, supra note 121, at 126.
Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533.
Case
C-201/13,
Deckmyn
v.
Vandersteen
(Sep.
3,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=152656&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
209
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fundamental rights, namely, Funke Medien, 217 Spiegel Online, 218 and
Pelham Moses. 219 All three cases landed at the CJEU upon a referral
from Germany and centered on the question of whether fundamental
rights as such can justify limitations on copyright. The CJEU was asked
to decide whether the balancing can take place outside of the internal
mechanisms incorporated in the InfoSoc Directive—in these particular
cases, outside of the framework for exceptions and limitations. The
Advocate General in all three cases was Advocate General (AG)
Szpunar, whose opinions have gained significant commentary from
academia. 220 Before delving into the analysis of the approach taken by
the CJEU, a brief summary of the facts in the three cases are provided
below, together with the opinion of the AG.

Case C‑469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (July
29,
2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN.
Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=208881&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
See, e.g., Lionel Bently et al., Sound Sampling, a Permitted Use Under EU Copyright
217

218

219

220

Law? Opinion of the European Copyright Society in Relation to the Pending Reference
Before the CJEU in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 467, 468–72 (2019); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko,

The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the EU and the Funke
Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some
Way to Go!, 51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 282, 285 (2020);
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External
Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the
Way, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 131, 131–37 (2019); Jonathan Griffiths, European
Union Copyright Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights—Advocate General
Szpunar’s Opinions in (C-469/17) Funke Medien, (C-476/17) Pelham GmbH and (C516/17) Spiegel Online, 20 ERA FORUM: J. ACAD. EUR. L. 35, 46–49 (2019); Bernd
Justin Jütte, Advocate General Suggests that Germany Cannot Rely on Copyright to
Protect Confidential Information, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 83, 83–85; Bernd
Justin Jütte & João Pedro Quintais, Advocate General Turns Down the Music—
Sampling Is Not a Fundamental Right Under EU Copyright Law: Pelham v. Hutter, 41
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 654, 654–57 (2019) [hereinafter Jütte & Quintais, Advocate
General Turns Down the Music]; Jütte and Quintais, supra note 120; Tito Rendas,
Advocate General Szpunar in Spiegel Online (or Why We Need Fair Use in the EU),
14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 265, 265–67; Sganga, supra note 154; Thom Snijders &
Stijn van Deursen, The Road Not Taken—The CJEU Sheds Light on the Role of
Fundamental Rights in the European Copyright Framework—A Case Note on the
Pelham, Spiegel Online and Funke Medien Decisions, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 1176, 1184–86 (2019).
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1. Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Funke Medien concerned a dispute between the Federal Republic
of Germany and Funke Medien, the operator of the website of a daily
newspaper. 221 The conflict involved Funke Medien’s the publication of
a large portion of military status reports, known as the “Afghanistan
Papers,” drawn up on a weekly basis by the Federal Armed Forces
pertaining to the deployments of the armed forces. 222 Funke Medien had
applied for access to these reports spanning from September 1, 2001,
through September 26, 2012; but for reasons of confidentiality and
security-sensitive interests of the Federal Armed Forces, the request was
denied. 223 Nonetheless, the company obtained access to a large portion
of these briefings and eventually published them. 224
The Federal Republic of Germany brought proceedings for
copyright infringement and was granted an injunction by the first
instance court, which was upheld on appeal. 225 The case then reached
the German Federal Court of Justice, which stayed the proceedings and
referred several questions to the CJEU for guidance. 226 The CJEU was
essentially asked: (1) whether Member States enjoy certain leeway on
the implementation of exclusive rights and exceptions into national law;
(2) how fundamental rights must be taken into consideration when
interpreting limitations and exceptions; and (3) whether fundamental
rights can justify adoption of permitted uses beyond those provided in
the InfoSoc Directive. 227
In this case, the AG took a step back and, before resolving the
specific questions, addressed a crucial point, namely, whether a military
report, being a non-fictional work, enjoys copyright protection in the
first place. The AG skeptically stated that it is rather unlikely that when
these reports were drafted, the authors, who were unknown, could
exercise free and creative choices to express their creative abilities. 228
Thus, due to the “purely informative” nature of the documents,
“inevitably drafted in simple and neutral terms,” these documents
lacked the necessary originality to warrant copyright protection in the
first place. 229 Having said that, the AG went further to assess the brittle
copyright and fundamental rights intersection and concluded that, in
Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para.
10 (Oct. 25, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=207024&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
3417937 (opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
Id. paras. 9–10.
Id. para. 10.
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Id.
Id. para. 19.
Id. para. 19.

2020]

COPYRIGHT & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE BALLROOM 643

this particular case, permitting a government to invoke fundamental
protection in the form of copyright against its citizens “would be at odds
with the very rationale behind fundamental rights . . . which is to protect
individuals against the State, not the State against individuals.” 230 The
AG’s opinion has been described as a welcome reminder that copyright
is not the most important thing; rather, it serves a very specific purpose—
something that, amidst the ubiquity of copyright discussion in the EU
copyright reform, may have been forgotten. 231

2. Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck
Spiegel Online involved the dispute between the German
politician, Volker Beck, and the news publisher Spiegel Online. Beck,
a member of the Bundestag from 1994 to 2017, had written a piece on
criminal policy relating to sexual offenses committed against minors. 232
The piece was published anonymously as part of a book compilation in
1988. When the compilation was put together, the publisher changed
the title of Beck’s contribution and shortened one of its sentences. 233
Over the years, the author tried to actively distance himself from the
work that was published. 234 In 2013, when Beck was running as a
candidate in the parliamentary elections in Germany, the manuscript of
the work emerged from the archives. 235 In an attempt to demonstrate
that his work had been amended by the publisher, Beck provided
various newspaper editors with his original manuscript and the amended
version. 236 Importantly, however, he did not authorize the publication of
the two documents. Instead, on his personal page, he provided versions
of the two documents and accompanied them with the qualification, “I
dissociate myself from this contribution,” and also added a note to the
article published in the book stating that the publisher had distorted the
text. 237
The defendant news site, Spiegel Online, published an article
claiming that Beck had been misleading the public for years since the
content of his manuscript had essentially not been distorted by the

230
231

Id. para. 53.
See Jütte, supra note 220, at 85.

Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 12 (Jan. 10, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209682&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN (opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
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Id. para. 13.
Id.

Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 11 (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&m
ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3418785.
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publisher in the original 1988 publication. 238 In the article, Spiegel
Online also made the original versions of the manuscript and the article
as published in the book available for download via hyperlinks. 239 The
two versions provided by Spiegel Online did not contain the disclaimers
made by Beck in order to allow the public to make their own
unprejudiced assessment. 240 Beck requested that Spiegel Online replace
the files with actual hyperlinks to his personal website, where the two
documents contained the disclaimers. Since Spiegel Online refused to
do so, Beck claimed copyright infringement on the basis that his article
had been made available on Speigel Online’s website without his
authorization. 241
The news portal based its defense on the exception to copyright
infringement for the purpose of reporting current events and quotation.
It argued that, when evaluated in the context of the fundamental right to
information and the press, the two provisions exempted their actions
from copyright infringement. The first and the second instance courts
in Germany ruled in favor of Beck and upheld the copyright
infringement claim. 242 Eventually, when the case reached the German
Federal Court of Justice, the court stayed the proceedings and referred
several questions to the CJEU for guidance, many of which overlapped
with those in the Funke Medien case. 243
The discourse essentially turned on the delicate interaction
between copyright-exclusive rights, exceptions, and limitations, and
fundamental rights. Among other things, the CJEU was asked to
determine how fundamental rights from the Charter must be taken into
account when determining the scope of copyright exceptions and
limitations 244—in particular, whether fundamental rights of freedom and
information or freedom of the press justify permitted uses beyond those
explicitly provided in the InfoSoc Directive. 245 AG Szpunar stressed the
exhaustive nature of the exceptions and limitations in the InfoSoc
Directive. 246 Accordingly, Member States cannot adopt permitted uses
unless the uses are present in the Article 5 catalogue.
In the present case, the AG found that none of the permitted uses
applied to the activities of Spiegel Online. 247 In response to the question
on whether fundamental rights concerns can justify going beyond the
Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 14 (Jan. 10, 2019) (opinion of
Advocate General Szpunar).
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Id.
See id. paras. 40, 72.
Id. para. 15.
Id. para. 15.
See id. para. 16.
Id. para. 16(2).
Id. para. 16(3).
See id. para. 20.
Id. para. 82.
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closed list of exceptions and limitations, the AG firmly rejected this as a
possible option. 248 According to him, copyright law itself already
contained internal mechanisms like the specific exceptions and
limitations aimed at reconciling the exclusive rights of authors with
fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression. 249 In other words,
the court cannot overstep its powers and become a legislature by
bringing in a “fair use clause” into the EU copyright framework. 250
Nonetheless, the public’s interest in allowing Spiegel Online’s use and
the lack of economic prejudice to Beck prompted some academics to
describe the case as a “paradigmatic case of a fair use.” 251

3. Pelham GmbH v. Hütter
The third case in this famous triad, 252 Pelham GmbH, concerned a
dispute between the German band Kraftwerk and the producer
company Pelham GmbH. 253 The facts of the case center on the issue of
digital sound sampling—a technique of electronically copying a portion,
or sample, of a sound recording for the purpose of reusing it in a new
sound recording. When incorporated into a new sound recording, the
samples are often mixed, modified, and looped. 254 The dispute revolved
around the song “Metall auf Metall” published by Kraftwerk in 1977. 255
Pelham sampled approximately two seconds of a rhythm sequence from
the song and incorporated it into a continuous loop in the song “Nur
mir” produced by Pelham and performed by the singer Sabrina Setlur. 256
Kraftwerk claimed that such use infringed its related right as a producer
and brought a copyright infringement lawsuit in the German courts. 257
The case passed through various levels of the German judiciary.
Kraftwerk was successful at all levels apart from the German
Constitutional Court, which held that requiring the samplers to secure
permission from the copyright holders would constitute an unjustified
infringement of the right to artistic freedom provided in German Basic
Law—i.e., the German Constitution. 258
Thereafter, the dispute, once again, ended up at the German
Federal Court that stayed the proceedings and referred several
248
249
250
251
252

Id. para. 81.
Id. para. 62.
Id. para. 63.
See Rendas, supra note 220, at 267.
Sganga, supra note 154.

Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (Dec. 12, 2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208881&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN (opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
Id. para. 1.
Id. para. 12.
Id. paras. 13–14.
Id. para. 15.
Id. paras. 86–88.

253

254
255
256
257
258

646

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

questions for interpretation to the CJEU. 259 Various issues were at stake
in this case, such as, the scope of exclusive rights and permitted uses,
the validity of open norms, and flexibilities when implementing
exceptions. 260 Nonetheless, for the purpose of the present discussion,
once again, the copyright-fundamental-rights intersection was crucial.
Accordingly, the CJEU was asked to elaborate upon the manner in
which fundamental rights set out in the Charter were to be taken into
account when evaluating the scope of exclusive rights, exceptions, and
limitations. 261
The AG examined the potential clash between Article 13 of the
Charter—the freedom of the arts—and the exclusive right of
reproduction of the producers and stated that such conflict is somewhat
paradoxical. 262 The main objective of copyright and related rights is to
promote the development of the arts by ensuring that artists receive
revenue from their work so that they are not dependent on patrons and
are free to pursue their creative activity. 263 This freedom is not restricted
by the requirement of obtaining a license for sampling, which is seen as
a normal market constraint. 264 An important warning message from the
AG was that, while the protection granted to record producers may
seem excessive as it is equal to that of authors, it is not for the CJEU to
make this judgment. 265
It cannot be ruled out that, in the future, the EU legislature may
introduce a specific exception addressing sampling situations such as the
one at stake in Pelham, but that falls within the competencies of the
legislature, not of the CJEU. In the meantime, the role of fundamental
rights in the discourse of copyright law is that of ultima ratio—that the
CJEU cannot depart “from the wording of the relevant copyright
provisions except in cases of gross violation[s] of the essence of a
fundamental right.” 266 In the present discourse on the freedom of the
arts, it was the AG’s opinion that such violations had not occurred.
Following his opinion, academics have called for a more flexible
interpretation of the relevant copyright provisions in light of the
fundamental rights involved, and, as such, the AG’s opinion has been
viewed as too restrictive. 267
The facts of the three cases differ and some academics, as well as
the Advocate General Szpunar himself, have agreed that only the
Pelham case was indeed a true copyright case, while the other two
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

Id. para. 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 83.
Id.
Id. para. 96.
Id. para. 98.
Id.
Jütte & Quintais, Advocate General Turns Down the Music, supra note 220, at 657.
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pertained to military reports and the issue of a politician distancing
himself from his own previous statements. 268 Nonetheless, there is a
thread that ties the three cases together: they all analyzed the issue of
where to locate the balancing exercise. The CJEU faced the question
whether the EU copyright system itself can accommodate the tension
between various fundamental rights. Particularly, the court had to
evaluate whether, apart from the mechanisms already enshrined in the
InfoSoc Directive, fundamental rights can be an autonomous external
ground for balancing and, in these cases, limiting copyright. 269
Through these judgments, the CJEU has once more reaffirmed
that the list of copyright exceptions in the EU is a closed one. 270
Furthermore, the InfoSoc Directive safeguards a fair balance between
the interests of rightsholders, users, and the public. 271 Another common
holding is that exceptions and limitations are specifically aimed at
favoring fundamental rights, such as, the freedom of expression and the
freedom of the press, whereby a fair balance has to be stuck through the
internal mechanisms of the InfoSoc Directive. 272 The CJEU, following
the AG’s tone, has been very clear in its stance that allowing Member
States to deviate from the closed list of exceptions provided in the
InfoSoc Directive would conflict with the legislative powers of the EU.
In other words, expanding the exhaustive list of exceptions is not a task
for the court. Nonetheless, the CJEU has also underscored that should
a Member State decide to introduce any of the optional exceptions in
Article 5, both the transposition as well as the interpretation of that

Such comment was made by Advocate General Szpunar and Tito Rendas at the
conference entitled, Owning Expression and Propertizing Speech—Freedom of
Expression v. Copyright Before the European Courts, held at the University of
Luxembourg on November 7, 2019. More information on the conference is available
at: https://www.eventbrite.fr/e/owning-expression-and-propertizing-speech-freedom-ofexpression-v-copyright-before-the-european-registration-73792670865?ref=ebtn#
[https://perma.cc/VGB8-BNTQ] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
Snijders & van Deursen, supra note 220, at 1177.
See Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 41 (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209682&pageIndex
=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3418452; Case C-469/17,
Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 56 (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex
=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3417937%20 (opinion of
Advocate General Szpunar); Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, para. 58 (July
29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208881
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
See Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH, para. 59; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH,
para. 42; Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH, para. 57.
See Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH, para. 60; Case C-516/17, Spiegel
Online GmbH, para. 45.
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exception must take place in full adherence to the fundamental rights
enshrined in the Charter. 273

D. Fundamental Rights as an Autonomous External Ground for
Balancing?
The outcome of these CJEU cases is not entirely surprising. 274 The
CJEU could not have gone beyond what the copyright provisions
expressly state. This is to be differentiated from the field of
intermediaries’ liability—an area of the acquis that, until the recent EU
copyright reform, was only roughly sketched in legislation. 275 In that
respect, one gets the feeling that when secondary legislation does not
deal directly with the issue, as in the intermediaries’ liability cases, the
court resorts to the Charter’s proportionality assessment to maintain the
fair balance of interests. 276 On the contrary, whenever the relevant
secondary legislation deals explicitly with a certain issue, as in the
exceptions and limitations cases, the assessment must remain within the
internal balancing field. In these circumstances, the court is strongly
driven by the fact that certain features of copyright law have indeed been
harmonized in the InfoSoc Directive.
In addition, when focusing on the internal balancing mechanism,
the court has affirmed that many features of the InfoSoc Directive reflect
the copyright-fundamental-rights equilibrium. Indeed, it is not a novel
idea that, nowadays, secondary legislation actually sets fundamental right
standards—something that Professor Muir refers to as the “functional”
power to regulate fundamental rights. 277 In fact, the EU institutions have
regularly reflected fundamental rights standards in the preambles of the
directives. 278 The EU Commission has even committed itself to pay
closer attention to the fundamental rights landscape as part of the
legislative process itself. 279 What is not that clear, however, is whether
the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive sufficiently reflect the
fundamental rights standards.
Although the CJEU has proclaimed that the permitted uses in
Article 5 are not to be considered mere exceptions, but as positive users’
Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH, para. 59; Case C-469/17, Funke Medien
NRW GmbH, para. 76.
Snijders & van Deursen, supra note 220, at 1184.
Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?, supra note 121, at 72.
Griffiths, supra note 117, at 149.
Elise Muir, The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some
Constitutional Challenges, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 219, 226 (2014).
See id. at 227 (“[EU] institutions have for several years already inserted standard
273

274
275
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formulae in the preamble to legislation in order to assert that the text complies with
fundamental rights.”).

Strategy for the Effective Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by
the European Union, at 6, COM (2010) 573 final (Oct. 19, 2010).
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rights 280 and must be interpreted by fully adhering to the fundamental
rights of the Charter, 281 the overall picture still bears some serious
shortcomings. In particular, doubts still exist as to whether the closed
list of exceptions and limitations legitimately caters to all possible
fundamental rights conflicts, even though fundamental rights concerns
fuel some of these permitted uses. 282 In other words, allowing a
politician—on the basis of a copyright claim—to prevent the circulation
of material that is in the interest of the general public or permitting a
Member State to enforce a fundamental right against individuals seems
rather counterintuitive.
In 2018, Professor Griffiths suggested that, when the situation at
stake is not covered by the exceptions and limitations, one can go
straight to the Charter. 283 Additionally, the enhanced status of the
Charter has shifted the balance of power from the legislature to the
judiciary. 284 Despite this newfound ability to resort to external balancing,
the three 2019 CJEU judgments have entirely shut the door to such
balancing of copyrights with fundamental rights.

V. FINAL REMARKS: ARE THE UNITED STATES AND THE EU
MOVING IN SYNC?
This paper explored the approaches taken by U.S. and EU courts
in striking a balance between copyright and fundamental rights. This
final part assesses when it is that the two jurisdictions dance in harmony
and when instead they swirl away from one another.
So far, the essence of internal and external balancing has been
analyzed. Within copyright law, this occurs through internal
mechanisms capable of accommodating the use of copyrighted material
by users who are not rightsholders, including uses grounded on
fundamental values, such as, free speech in the United States or the
fundamental rights protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights
in the EU. This internal balancing has a double nature: it can be
mechanical—namely, through the permitted uses and the ideaSee Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
para. 70 (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online
GmbH v. Beck, para. 54 (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document
/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
See Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
para. 76; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 59.
See Geiger & Izyumenko, supra note 220, at 29; Snijders & van Deursen, supra note
220, at 1184.
Griffiths, supra note 118, at 161.
Id. at 174.
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expression dichotomy—or substantive, resting upon the premise that
both copyright and free speech share the same goal. 285 In light of society’s
broad interest in having public access to the fruits of authors’ efforts,
copyright and human rights are deemed to point to the same
fundamental equilibrium. 286 While the mechanical internal balancing
tools are common to all copyright systems, the substantive internal
balancing mechanisms are typical of the United States. 287 When these
internal balancing mechanisms are no longer apt to internalize conflicts
deriving from fundamental rights, a real conflict between copyright and
human rights manifests and, in principle, calls for a balancing exercise
to take place outside the copyright realm in both jurisdictions. 288
The paper then moved from the theory to practice and traced the
case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, the most influential U.S. Courts of
Appeals, and that of the CJEU, in pursuit of ascertaining how the
judiciary in each jurisdiction implements the above mechanisms. The
cases demonstrate that even though, in theory, the same general setting
is in place, in practice, the approaches followed in the United States and
the EU differ on several elements.
First, when copyright and human rights clash, the United States
places a stricter reliance on the internal safeguards, while the EU turns
to the Charter—an external safeguard—as the main tool to relieve the
tension. Second, regarding the substance of the internal safeguards,
while it is true that the idea-expression dichotomy is equally respected
in the EU and the United States, strong differences clearly surface when
it comes to the second internal safeguard—the permitted uses. While in
the EU, a closed catalogue of permitted uses applies, in the United
States, the fair use doctrine plays that respective role. 289 At this point, the
two jurisdictions swirl away from each other but still gently hold hands.
Third, while the CJEU tends to balance the interests of copyright
holders against a range of diverse fundamental rights protected under
the EU Charter, U.S. courts only refer to the right to free speech as
enshrined in the First Amendment.
The reason for this divergence between United States and EU case
law is multifold. Starting with the difference in emphasis as to internal
Birnhack, supra note 107, at 49.
Paul Torremans, Copyright (and Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human
Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 221, 223 (Paul Torremans
ed., 2015).
Birnhack, supra note 107, at 61.
Id. at 52.
See Wittem Group, European Copyright Code, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 76, 81
(2011); see also Griffiths, supra note 26; Bernt P. Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can
EU Authors’ Right Accommodate Fair Use, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EU COPYRIGHT LAW 417 (Irini Stamatoudi ed., 2016); Rendas,
supra note 26; Paul Torremans, The Perspective of the Introduction of a European Fair
Use Clause, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW—CHALLENGES AND
PERSPECTIVES 319 (Tatiana Eleni Synodinou ed., 2012).
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or external safeguards, the incongruence can be traced back to the
jurisdictions’ differing approaches towards the conflict between
copyright and human rights. In the first wave of case law on
intermediaries’ liability, 290 the CJEU expressly recognized the existence
of a conflict between copyright and other fundamental rights and
resorted to a proportionality assessment to solve it. Conversely, U.S.
courts tended—and still tend—to neglect the presence of a conflict in the
first place and eventually rely on the internal safeguards to resolve the
dispute. 291 In other words, while in the United States the conflict is
“internalized,” in the EU, at least in the category of intermediaries’
liability, it has been addressed externally.
This, in turn, mirrors the different roots of copyright law in civil
and common law jurisdictions. In the United States, copyright protects
private interests with the ultimate goal of fostering progress, but it does
not have the status of a fundamental right. On the contrary, in the EU,
copyright is afforded such status. Therefore, even though the EU
legislature may try to take fundamental rights into account as part of the
legislative process, fundamental values cannot be adequately crafted ex
ante in a way that equally respects values such as freedom of expression
but also data protection, right to privacy, the freedom to conduct
business, and intellectual property rights. Consequently, like the cases
on intermediaries’ liability demonstrate, 292 these values ought to be
weighed against each other any time a possible conflict arises—that is, on
a case-by-case basis.
Moving to the difference in the use of internal balancing
instruments—namely, permitted uses—a closed list of exceptions leads to
an approach completely different from that under a general and open
standard like fair use, which, due to its flexibility, accommodates new
circumstances arising from societal and technological developments. As
a result, fair use is deemed to keep the mechanism of resolving conflicts
with the copyright system up to date. The same, however, cannot be said
of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive, which in itself “does not constitute
full harmonisation of the scope of the exceptions and limitations which
it contains.” 293 Moreover, over the years, apart from some outlier cases, 294
See supra Section IV.B.
See Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and
Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233, 235–36 (2003).
See supra Section IV.B.
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Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 27 (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex
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we have witnessed a growing tightening of the system of European
exceptions as a result of the increasing importance of economic rights. 295
This has led a majority of cases to interpret the exhaustive list of
exceptions provided by EU law in a manner incompatible with the
changing technological times, which, in turn, has moved the resolution
of conflicts related to intermediaries’ liability outside the copyright
system. 296
It should also be noted that, as the balancing occurs through
different tools—the proportionality test in the EU and internal
safeguards in the United States—the steps followed do not coincide.
While both the proportionality test and the fair use doctrine are
particularly fact-sensitive, the elements of the former are much more
connected to one another than the four factors of fair use. As far as the
proportionality test is concerned, the legitimate purpose of the
proposed measure, assessed in light of the pursued objective, coupled
with the requirement of establishing necessity in the given
circumstances, are the first three elements, which seem to flow naturally
and logically to eventually culminate in the final step—the actual
balancing of the benefits gained by the proposed measure and the harm
caused to the fundamental right. As a result, balancing takes place only
as part of the last step of the proportionality test. On the other hand, the
four factors of the fair use doctrine are assessed separately, and the
eventual balancing occurs among all of them together. Moreover,
additional factors can be considered. Depending on the circumstances,
the market, and the use in question, some of the four factors would
weigh more than the others, which is certainly not the case with the
proportionality test where none of the four steps takes precedence.
The minuet between U.S. and EU jurisprudence on the
intersection between copyright and human rights does not end with the
partners separated from one another. As already pointed out, the
difference in the approaches lies more in the formal recognition of a
conflict between copyright and human rights than in the adoption of a
balancing practice between copyright and other interests. However
framed, in both jurisdictions, a balancing of copyright protection against
values protected by fundamental rights does seem to be—even when
implied—a necessary step in the decision-making process.

46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93 (2015) (welcoming the CJEU’s
departure from the doctrine of strict interpretation of exceptions and limitations in cases
in which fundamental rights such as freedom of expression are involved).
COPYRIGHT RECONSTRUCTED: RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN A
TIME OF HIGHLY DYNAMIC TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (P. Bernt
Hugenholtz ed., 2018).
See Georgios I. Zekos, Copyrights and Trademarks in Cyberspace: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 313, 342–44 (2016) (discussing the
shortcomings of the EU exceptions regarding recent technological developments).
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Regardless of the conceptualization of the balancing performed by
U.S. and EU courts as internal or external—and regardless of the
instruments entailed—in both cases, a balancing does take place
whenever a conflict between different interests occurs. Thus, in both
jurisdictions, the judiciary employs a certain degree of flexibility. While
this may not be new in the United States—as the fair use doctrine has
often enabled copyright to adjust to social and technological
developments 297—it is indeed novel in the EU, where the call for a more
flexible copyright—particularly, in relation to the exception and
limitation regimes—has been made for years. 298 In a way, then, the
proportionality test as employed by the CJEU, as well as by many
national courts, provides a degree of flexibility that the fair use doctrine
has always provided in the United States. 299 Interestingly, this has also
been the case in several European Member States where courts, in
dealing with artistic expression, have come to the point of introducing a
sort of “fair use” approach through the application of fundamental rights
as external limitations to copyright law. 300
More recently, however, the CJEU has hinted at a slight change of
direction in three cases where a clash between copyright and
fundamental rights—namely, freedom of information, 301 freedom of the
press, 302 and artistic freedom 303—appeared before the court. In all of
them, the court has preferred to rely on permitted uses instead of
recurring to external balancing. In the court’s opinion, the three
fundamental rights in question “are not capable of justifying, beyond the
exceptions and limitations . . . a derogation from the author’s exclusive
rights of reproduction and of communication to the public.” 304
This strong assertion may suggest that, in the context of exceptions
and limitations, the CJEU “has closed the door on the application of
Sag, supra note 28.
P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of
Flexibilities,
SSRN
ELECTRONIC
J.
(Nov.
15,
2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1959554 [https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1959554].
Christophe Geiger, “Fair Use” Through Fundamental Rights: When Freedom of
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Artistic Expression Allows Creative Appropriations and Opens up Statutory Copyright
Limitations, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN

COPYRIGHT LAW (Wee Loon ed., 2019) (analyzing French and German cases in which
copyright was juxtaposed with freedom of artistic expression).
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Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (July
29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216545
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3463672.
Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3465797.
Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216552&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3466043.
Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH, para. 96(2) (emphasis added).
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fundamental rights as an external limitation to copyright.” 305 It must,
nonetheless, be highlighted that when the court actually strikes the
balance between exclusive rights of rightsholders and exceptions and
limitations safeguarding the interests of users, it states that provisions
must be interpreted in full adherence to the fundamental rights
enshrined in the Charter. 306 In a way, the CJEU seems to bring inside
copyright the balancing practice that had so far—at least in the
intermediaries’ liability line of cases—taken place outside of it.
This twist brings our two dancers, the United States and the EU,
closer. The court’s strong emphasis on the fact that exceptions and
limitations actually confer rights on the users 307 by bringing the balancing
exercise within the parameters of the copyright system echoes the
approach that U.S. courts have followed from Eldred onward. Both
jurisdictions now stand on the same ground and seem to confirm the
self-sufficiency of the copyright framework in handling the equilibrium.
It remains to be seen whether the mechanics of the proportionality test
and the balancing exercise entailed will result in further divergences
between the two jurisdictions or whether they will eventually mutually
influence each other. In their next dance, will the EU and the United
States dance off to their own music or will they move in sync?
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